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1.1 How and Why the Project Was Selected 
As a subcontractor to NASA, United Space Alliance (USA) is 
responsible for the day-to-day operations of the Space Shuttle. 
The loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia and crew on February 1, 
2003, was a tragic reminder of the potential dangers of manned 
space flight and had a profound effect on USA's vision of being a 
"world leader in space operations on Earth, on orbit and beyond."
SRB ......SRB 
The Space Shuttle Columbia Accident revealed a fundamental 
problem of the Space Shuttle Program regarding debris. 	 Prior to 
the tragedy, the Space Shuttle requirement stated that no debris 
should be liberated that would jeopardize the flight crew and/or 
mission success. When the accident investigation determined that )rhii 
a large piece of foam debris was the primary cause of the loss of 
the shuttle and crew, it became apparent that the risk and scope of - 
damage that could be caused by certain types of debris, especially - 
ice and foam, were not fully understood.	 There was no clear  
understanding of the materials that could become debris, the path I 
the debris might take during flight, the structures the debris might
- - impact or the damage the impact might cause.
Because of  the accident investigation findings, NASA issued a	 - 
requirement to all Shuttle Elements, including the Orbiter, Figure 1. Space Shuttle 
External Tank and Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) (Figure 1) to define their debris environment and 
verify their structural capability to withstand debris impacts. The SRB Debris Assessment team 
was formed to address the new debris requirements to ensure that the SRBs were safe for the 
Shuttle's Return to Flight (RTF) by verifying that the SRB hardware would not sustain damage 
that could potentially lead to catastrophic results if impacted by foam or ice debris. Since no 
such work had been done before at SRB, a new innovative process had to be created, executed 
and validated before the Space Shuttle would be allowed to launch again. 
1.2 How the Team's Project Goal(s) Aligned to the Organization's Goal(s) 
In addition to supporting the primary NASA and USA goal of returning the Space Shuttle to 
flight by understanding the SRB debris environment and capability to withstand that 
environment, the SRB debris assessment project was divided into four primary tasks that were 
required to be completed to support the RTF goal. These tasks were (1) debris environment 
definition, (2) impact testing, (3) model correlation and (4) hardware evaluation. Additionally, 
the project aligned with USA's corporate goals of safety, customer satisfaction, professional 
development and fiscal accountability. 
Safety - Provide safe operations for all aspects of our business 
The team focused on safety by verifying that critical SRB hardware would still function as 
designed after being impacted by debris. If critical components did not function as expected, the 
safety of the mission and crew could be compromised. The team was encouraged to investigate 
possible design/process changes that could either improve an unacceptable margin of safety or 
reduce the risk associated with a debris impact. From an analysis perspective, safe operations 
are implemented by following a rigorous checking/reviewing process that ensures all analyses 
are technically sound and accurate. This focus on safety, both in terms of the hardware 
performance and the supporting analysis, would provide a direct benefit to key stakeholders, 
USA, NASA and the flight crew, because it would ensure that the SRBs were safe for flight. 
Customer Satisfaction - Achieve excellent customer satisfaction and outstanding quality 
NASA's satisfaction with the work of USA-SRB Element and the team is of the utmost 
importance. The primary measures of this goal are meeting key milestones to support the Shuttle 
launch and receiving positive comments and recognition from NASA. The key stakeholders are 
USA-SRB Element and NASA. 
Professional Development - Be the company of choice for our employees 
USA-SRB Element recognizes that complex engineering problems, such as debris assessment, 
require a variety of specialized skills only attainable through experience. This project offered 
team members opportunities to improve their skills and develop their experience base through 
mentoring, training and leadership development. The primary stakeholders for this goal are 
USA-SRB Element and the team member's respective organizations because, through this 
project, team members will become more experienced and knowledgeable with additional 
capabilities for tackling difficult problems in the future. 
Fiscal Accountability - Provide excellent financial returns to our stakeholders 
Part of the project involved implementing a test program, which can be very costly in terms of 
acquiring a facility, instrumentation and test articles, as well as analytical and test support 
personnel and travel costs. This project needed to be carefully managed to prevent unnecessary 
expenditures in all of these categories. The financial returns of this project can be measured as a 
cost savings to USA and NASA stakeholders for the work performed, as well as the preservation 
of valuable flight assets. 
1.3 How the Team Members Were Selected 
Sub-teams were formed to focus on each of the four specific project tasks. This allowed for 
expertise in each of the four areas and balanced the workload among the team members. The 
team was also well balanced with individuals skilled in theoretical work and practical 
application. This helped the team perform more effectively because one portion of the team was 
able to provide a solid theoretical foundation for the analysis, and others on the team were able to 
implement those concepts with practical solutions. Two team members served as the overall 
project leaders to ensure that each of the four individual teams functioned together and did not 
lose sight of the overall goal. 
Team members were selected from three different organizations: Loads and Aerothermal 
Analysis, Aft Assembly Analysis, and Materials and Processes (M&P), based on their 
experiences, expertise, problem solving skills and job responsibilities as related to the specific 
needs for each of the four primary tasks. As part of their normal job function, Loads and 
Aerothermal Analysis defines loads and environments for the SRB and performs a significant 
amount of testing. Aft Assembly Analysis performs structural analyses for SRB hardware. 
M&P works with SRB hardware and thermal protection system materials. 
Debris Environment Definition required processing extremely large volumes of data to 
determine the critical conditions for SRB hardware. Team members had organizational skills for 
managing the data plus previous experience in writing specialized computer programs for data 
processing. They were also familiar with all SRB hardware and their applicable loads and 
environments required for analysis. 
Impact Testing required the preparation and execution of the test plan, design of test fixtures and 
the test set-up, management of facility logistics/scheduling, high-speed video recording and data 
acquisition/management, and preparation and handling of the debris projectiles and impact 
targets. Team members had previous experience in testing and instrumentation selection. M&P
had the responsibility for procuring, preparing and instrumenting the test articles and projectiles 
as well as assessing the post-impact condition of the test articles. 
Model Correlation required an understanding of the test configuration and instrumentation, raw 
test data and the dynamic response of structures. Team members had previous experience 
working with test data and constructing computer models. 
Hardware Evaluation required knowledge of finite element analysis, three-dimensional model 
construction and an understanding of structural analysis. Many of the team members for this 
task were new employees selected for their ability to quickly learn new software and analysis 
techniques. 
2.1 How the Team Identified Potential Changes for Improvement/Innovation 
Foam debris loss and the resulting impacts that occurred without major damage had become so 
common during Shuttle flights that the impacts were not considered a serious threat to the safety 
of the Shuttle or crew. The accident investigation report states that: 
With each successful landing, it appears that NASA engineers and managers increasingly 
regarded the foam-shedding as inevitable, and as either unlikely to jeopardize safety or 
simply an acceptable risk. The distinction between foam loss and debris events also appears 
to have become blurred. NASA and contractor personnel came to view foam strikes not as a 
safety of flight issue, but rather a simple maintenance, or "turnaround" issue.' 
When the accident investigation team performed impact testing with foam blocks they arrived at 
a surprising result. In complete contrast to many of the pre-existing beliefs about the dangers of 
foam debris, these impacts caused significant damage to the Shuttle and confirmed that the foam 
debris impact was the cause of the accident. Therefore, it was evident that NASA needed to 
develop an innovative process to address the newly identified debris risk. 
With the new debris requirements, NASA developed an engineering process that outlined the 
numerous steps that were needed to understand the debris environment and Shuttle capability in 
order to safely return to flight. At a minimum, NASA required all Shuttle Elements perform 
impact testing and build computer models to validate the impact test data. The specifics for what 
needed to be done and how it should be accomplished were left up to each Shuttle Element. 
Research indicated that previous debris impact assessments had only addressed low-velocity 
liftoff debris by drop-testing simulated ice balls on flat panels. These previous tests did not 
address the potential for high-velocity impacts of ice or foam debris during flight. High-velocity 
impacts would require the development of appropriate tools such as detailed dynamic models to 
support testing and analysis. The team realized that the entire process had to be developed from 
the ground up, and focused on four primary tasks necessary for evaluation. 
The team used a variety of tools to develop a process for the SRB Element debris evaluation. 
Team members attended technical interchange meetings within the Shuttle debris and analysis 
communities to brainstorm, exchange ideas and share lessons learned on various processes and 
procedures for each of the tasks. Data gathered at these meetings were analyzed and evaluated to 
determine if the analytical techniques or methodologies being used by other Elements could be 
applied or adapted to the SRB Element process that was being developed. Since the Orbiter 
Element had performed impact testing during the accident investigation, SRB took advantage of 
lessons learned in key areas, such as how to fire a projectile to reach the desired velocity. 
Additionally, the team conducted trade studies to evaluate various software tools to assist with 
the four tasks. 
"Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report," Volume 1, August 2003. 
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2.2 How Potential Changes were Evaluated and How the Final Change Was Selected 
The SRB Element determined that NASA's new debris requirements could be satisfied by 
focusing on four primary tasks: debris environment definition, impact testing, model correlation 
and hardware evaluation. The debris environment definition identified potential debris impacts 
to SRB hardware. Impact testing reproduced the predicted debris impacts by using an air-cannon 
to fire projectiles at high speeds at test targets. Model correlation used computer models to 
reproduce the impact test results, and hardware evaluation determined if the SRB hardware could 
survive a debris impact. The potential change being evaluated was a process the team developed 
that inter-connected each of the four tasks and is shown in a flow diagram (Figure 2). Within 
each of the four tasks, several process options were evaluated before selecting the final process. 
Debris Environment Definition 	 Impact Conditions 
I Debris	 Debris 	 • Mass	 • Location 
Source	 I	 Transport	 I	 • Velocity • Angle 
Density • Shape 
Bounding Conditions 
Hardware Evaluation 4	 Model Correlation	 Impact Testing 
	
Risk Acceptable	 Go for Risk Assessment	 Launch! 
Risk Unacceptable 
I Design/Process Change I 
Figure 2. Debris Assessment Tasks Process Flow Diagram to Support Return to Flight 
The debris environment definition came from an extensive list of potential debris sources that 
NASA down-selected to the sources with the greatest threat to the Shuttle vehicle (primarily ice 
and foam). These debris sources were evaluated with a modeling process, Debris Transport 
Analysis (DTA), that determined how the debris would travel after it was liberated and where the 
debris might impact. The results produced impact conditions that included the location, velocity 
and energy of the debris particle at the time of impact. A trade study would be needed to 
evaluate software tools that would be required for processing the debris results. 
Impact testing results from the Orbiter Element and additional data analysis indicated that the 
greatest debris threat to the Shuttle would be from ice and foam debris, and SRB needed to 
implement a test program for those materials. Through a selection process that included 
identifying potential test facilities, requesting vendor proposals, conducting on-site visits and 
witnessing demonstration tests, one facility was selected for foam testing and another was 
selected for ice testing. This allowed testing of both projectiles to be conducted simultaneously 
and saved a considerable amount of time, an important factor to minimize the delay in returning 
the Shuttle to flight. 
For the model correlation and hardware evaluation tasks, the team determined that the software 
currently in use by USA would not be adequate for the project because it could not sufficiently 
perform the high-speed dynamic analyses that would be required. An additional trade study 
would be needed to evaluate new software to find one that would best suit the needs of the team. 
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2.3 How the Final Change was Validated 
Since the change being implemented was a process, the validation was based on the effectiveness 
of that process to produce useable results and meet the needs of each task. The team identified 
the key products that would be generated by each task. Each task product was an input that was 
required to perform another task; therefore, team members performing each task were considered 
to be customers for the data products produced by the other tasks. A flow diagram identifies the 
tasks/customers in the circles and the products in the rectangles (Figure 3). The team also 
recognized that each customer would need to be involved in specifying the format of the data 
product they were to receive so it would best meet their needs and reduce the risk of 
misinterpretation of the data. 
Identify worst-case: 
^^Debris	
F - Masses 
• Impact velocities 
Environment
• Impact angles 
Definition
Impact conditions for 
critical SRB hardware
Impact \ 
Testing )
	
impact test results 
Evaluate/optimize
data quality 
Define critical
 
(Evaluation 
impact parameters	 Hardware Define:
	 Model 
• Projectile behavior	 Correlation 
• TPS behavior 
Figure 3. Debris Assessment Product/Customer Flow Diagram 
Debris Environment Definition - Team members that evaluated the debris environment data 
were responsible for providing results to support both the impact testing and hardware evaluation 
tasks. The impact testing task required data that included the worst-case masses, impact 
velocities and impact angles for use in the development of test plans. The hardware evaluation 
task required data specific to each of the critical components that required analysis. Team 
members performing the hardware evaluation needed to identify the parameters that produced 
the worst-case impact conditions to assist with the filtering of the debris environment data. 
Impact Testing - Team members that performed the impact testing would need to take the worst-
case debris environment conditions and develop a test program to impact targets with foam and 
ice projectiles. Data from these tests would be provided to team members performing the model 
correlation. In consideration of the model correlation task requirements, the impact testing 
defined the camera set-ups with multiple fields of view, frame rates and image resolutions to 
capture the projectile behavior for the use in the model correlation. 
Model Correlation - Team members that performed the model correlation would need to work 
closely with team members performing the impact testing to assist in the evaluation of data 
quality and adjust test conditions to optimize the data quality. Having good quality data from 
well-defined target locations was essential to reproducing the test results with the computer 
models. To support the hardware evaluation task, the model correlation task needed to define the 
behavior of the projectile as it impacted the target and the behavior of the thermal protection 
system as it failed due to the debris impact. (The thermal protection system (TPS) is a thin layer
of material, such as cork, used to protect the underlying SRB metallic structure from high 
temperatures during flight). 
Hardware Evaluation - Team members that performed the hardware evaluations used the 
projectile and TPS behavior at impact to perform studies to evaluate parameters, such as 
projectile orientation, impact location, impact angle and impact energy, that would produce the 
worst damage to a specific structure. The key parameters that had the greatest effect on impact 
damage were identified and provided to the debris environment definition task as parameters 
used to sort the debris environment data. 
3.1 How Potential Courses of Action for Improvement/Innovation Were Identified 
Once the team developed a process that identified the tasks that needed to be performed, the 
team proceeded with evaluating potential courses of action to implement the debris assessment 
process. Each of the four tasks had multiple solutions that were considered. The team used 
criteria, such as previous experience with similar problems, current knowledge/skill base, 
consultation with peers, and trial and error, to help establish the process for each task. The 
course of action for each task considered the product that would need to be produced as well as 
made sure that the needs of the customer and stakeholder were taken into account. The specific 
course of action selected for each task was based primarily on the skills of the team members 
selected to perform each task. 
3.2 How the Potential Courses of Action Were Evaluated and How the Course of Action 
Was Selected 
For each task, all potential courses of action that were identified would serve to provide the data 
necessary to determine the integrity of the hardware and provide launch support. Each potential 
course of action required evaluation to determine which would prove to be the best method to 
acquire the desired capabilities and tools while still meeting launch milestones. 
Debris Environment Definition - Based on 
previous programming experience, team members 
considered several different commercial off-the-
shelf (COTS) software applications such as 
Microsoft Excel, MATLAB, FORTRAN and C++ 
for processing the debris environment data. A 
trade study using the key parameters for the data 
analysis was performed (Figure 4). The data was 
not formatted in a way that could easily be read by 
MATLAB, and the majority of files were too large 
to be loaded into Excel directly; therefore, the 
Software Application 
Parameter + 
-1- 
C) E-
0 
Read file format X X 
Handle file size  X X X 
User familiarity X X X 
Ease of use X 
Easily modifiable X -
team chose to use a combination of FORTRAN	 Figure 4. Debris Environment 
and Excel to process and filter the data. This 	 Software Trade Study 
course of action worked well because, at the time 
the FORTRAN code was written, the hardware that was going to be evaluated had not been 
selected. The FORTRAN program was used to sort the data for each of the major SRB 
structures, making the file sizes small enough to be read by Excel. Then the data was further 
filtered to find impacts for specific components, by various impact parameters. 
Model Correlation - The team identified model correlation as a specific task in the process, 
however, since the team had no previous experience with high-speed impacts, it was not known 
whether computer models could be built and correlated to the test data. Therefore, one potential 
course UI act on as to conuui 
impact tests on all of the critical 
SRB hardware. A second course 
of action was to conduct limited 
testing that would provide 
enough information to conduct 
correlation studies ana aiiow ior 
the construction of computer	 Figure 5. Comparison of Model Correlation Options 
models that could accurately simulate the impact events. A comparison of each option was 
performed (Figure 5). The test only approach had the desirable aspect of physical test data for 
the hardware, but the data would be limited to the instrumentation locations and specific impact 
parameters (e.g. projectile mass, velocity, angle and location). The test/model approach would 
provide data for the entire structure and allow for variation in the impact parameters. The costs 
for both approaches would include hardware, test fixtures, data acquisition equipment and 
support personnel, but would be significantly more expensive for the test only approach. The 
team chose to proceed with the test/model option because it produced significantly more benefits 
than the test only option. 
Impact Testing - For impact testing, the team had three potential 
courses of action for the test targets (Figure 6). The testing could	 (only Flat	 Only Flight 
consist of only flight hardware, only flat panels or a combination 	 Panels )
	
Hardware 
of both. The team performed an analysis and determined that flat 
panels could be used to adequately represent the behavior of 
large SRB structures. Therefore, the majority of the impact 	 Combination 
testing was performed on flat panels. While the flat panel data 
was used for calibrating the computer models and as a 
verification of that calibration, some test data from flight 
hardware was also needed. Four SRB components were selected Figure 6. Impact Testing 
for impact testing because each had a critical function that had 	 Options 
the potential to compromise flight safety if the hardware could not withstand a debris impact. 
Additionally, these components had either a complex geometry or a less common TPS material 
for which models were not readily available, making it difficult to have confidence in model 
results without validation from test data. 
Hardware Evaluation - As mentioned previously, the current software tools for hardware 
analysis were not adequate for the high-speed debris impacts. The model correlation and 
hardware evaluation teams evaluated several industry standard COTS software packages 
including LS-DYNA, MSC Dytran and ABAQUS Explicit for use in the dynamic analysis. LS-
DYNA was selected for its efficiency and robustness. Additionally, LS-DYNA was compatible 
with ice and foam models that had been developed by the Orbiter Element. Another benefit was 
that a significant amount of model data from existing SRB static structural models could be 
imported into LS-DYNA allowing the dynamic models to be created much faster. 
3.3 How the Final Course of Action Was Validated 
Debris Environment Definition - The final course of action for this task was validated by the 
ability of team members to deliver data to the hardware evaluation team in a timely manner. 
Team members processed the nine GB of data with the FORTRAN code once, and used the 
results to establish large databases for all of the foam and ice impacts to each of the five major 
SRB structures. It would have been possible to write a very specialized FORTRAN program to 
process all of the data for each SRB component; however, the course of action selected was 
validated as the best solution as new components were considered for analysis. With the 
Test Only Test/Model 
Data limited to: Data Extended to: 
- Tested hardware -Entire structure 
- Instrumentation locations -Any location 
- Specific impact parameters -Various impact parameters 
Requires significant flight assets Requires limited flight assets
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Figure 7. Test and LS-DYNA
Model Simulated Impact 
database available, the extremely time consuming process of dealing with all of the data was not 
necessary. By filtering the databases in Excel, the team was able to take millions of SRB 
impacts and produce the critical impact conditions on a component within a few hours. 
Impact Testing - The final course of action for this task was validated by the ability of the test to 
produce quality data for the model correlation team. Since the analysts performing the 
correlation took an active role in the real-time processing of the test data, changes to the test set-
up and instrumentation could be incorporated to improve the data quality. For example, during 
testing of an SRB component, the number of measurements was increased from four to twelve 
based on recommendations from the analysts for additional data at specific locations. In another 
case, the analysts noted poor data quality and recommended a modification to the component's 
mounting structure that provided additional stiffness and improved the data. 
Model Correlation - Following the decision to implement the combined testing and modeling 
approach, the team set out to verify the effectiveness and accuracy of that course of action. In 
fact, a method to verify model results and establish their accuracy and validity was built into the 
plan through model correlation. Model correlation used the data collected during impact testing 
to perform an analysis with computer (or mathematical) models built to simulate the impacts 
from the testing. A comparison was made between the analytically generated behavior of the 
system to the test measured physical behavior of the system. By performing correlation studies, 
the mathematical models could be adjusted and relevant material parameters could be established 
to accurately predict both the response of the impacted structure and the behavior of the debris 
projectile. Once the appropriate material parameters were established, they were then used to 
model other structures. 
The test set-up allowed for rigorous control over 
projectile parameters such as impact angle, velocity, 
and projectile orientation, and data were recorded 
from several combinations of the parameters for the 
various targets. Each test shot attempted to record 
several video angles, strain gage, accelerometer and 
load cell readings which allowed for a thorough 
understanding of the behavior of the projectile as 
well as the structural and TPS response of the 
impacted target. 
The flat panel tests were used to generate the 
appropriate material and modeling techniques that 
would be necessary to model the subsequent flight 
hardware. Test photographs showing a foam block 
impacting a flat panel were compared to an LS-
DYNA computer simulation of the same event 
(Figure 7). Plots that represent a strain measurement 
recorded on the panel during the foam impact as 
well as the strain response predicted by the LS-
DYNA computer simulation were created (Figure 8). 
Note that the curves are the same general shape, and 
the strain values from the simulation are nearly 
identical to the peak strain response measured during 
the impact test. This indicates that the computer 
simulation can accurately reproduce the structural 
response of the panel to a foam impact.
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Figure 8. Test Measured and LS-DYNA Model Simulated Strain Response 
Once it was validated that computer simulations could accurately reproduce the impact behavior 
for a flat panel, additional models were built of selected SRB hardware to verify that the results 
could be extended to represent an arbitrary configuration. The post-impact comparison between 
the test data and LS-DYNA model simulation for the SRB Upper Strut Fairing indicate the same 
dent depth for a foam impact and show an example of 	 Measured Dciii Depth: 0.43 in 
hardware correlation (Figure 9). Test photographs 
showing a foam block impacting an Upper Strut Fairing 
were compared to an LS-DYNA model simulation of the 
same event and demonstrate how LS-DYNA was used to 
predict the behavior of the impacted structure (Figure 10). 
Similar to the flat panel test, the strain response predicted 
by LS-DYNA showed good agreement with the data 	 AVDC Shot No. 147€ 
recorded on Upper Strut Fairing during testing.
posttest 
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The primary goal of this project was to support the RTF debris effort. There were many tangible 
and intangible benefits to the NASA and USA-SRB Element stakeholders. Throughout this 
project, the 5kB Element was recognized by NASA as a pace-setting organization and earned 
respect from other Shuttle Elements for their work. The results of the analysis established the 
NASA stakeholder's confidence in the techniques that were used and the capability of USA-SRB 
Element to succeed in solving difficult problems. The debris efforts were a significant 
contribution to RTF providing all of the stakeholders with a sense of accomplishment and 
increased morale for being able to do their part in getting back to the business of space flight. 
Within USA-SRB Element, the project fostered a sense of camaraderie and taught valuable 
lessons on teamwork and customer focus. All of the team members gained valuable engineering 
experience that would have taken much longer than the length of this project to obtain under 
"normal" working conditions. 
It is clear from the validation of the course of action for each process that the SRB debris 
environment can be defined and the SRB capability to withstand debris can be determined. The 
debris data processing techniques were verified to supply the hardware evaluation team with the 
required environment. The hardware evaluation team verified that the SRB hardware capability 
to withstand debris impacts could be determined from dynamic models that had been correlated 
to test data. Therefore, it can be concluded that the final course of action will result in the 
accomplishment of the project's goals. 
4.1 How the Course of Action Was Implemented 
An area for potential resistance came from NASA concerns about the team's inexperience. The 
team was attempting an aggressive high-speed impact testing and modeling project in an area 
where they had very little experience and a very tight schedule. Fortunately, because of proven 
competency with previous projects, NASA had enough confidence in the team to continue with 
the project. NASA's concerns probably led them to take a more active role in the project than 
would be typical, and their involvement had the potential to cause resistance from team members 
who felt that the customer might have been overstepping their bounds. The team proved 
themselves very capable in this task and developed a more cooperative attitude with the 
customer. 
The stakeholders were extremely involved in all aspects of the project, making it very easy to 
achieve stakeholder buy-in. USA-SRB Element and our NASA customer attended numerous 
meetings and reviews conducted by the Space Shuttle Program managers to ensure that all 
Shuttle Elements worked together to achieve the RTF debris objectives. The debris environment 
definition and use of debris environment data were strongly supported by NASA, and all of the 
data had buy-in from the appropriate technical communities prior to its release to the Elements. 
The Space Shuttle Program management selected four potential facilities that could be used to 
conduct the impact testing, and stakeholders from the USA-SRB Element and NASA toured each 
facility to find the one that would best suit the project's needs. The impact test plans were 
thoroughly reviewed by USA-SRB Element and NASA stakeholders for buy-in. Once approved, 
the plans were submitted to the Space Shuttle Program managers for final approval that was 
required before testing could begin. Stakeholders from NASA and USA-SRB Element were on-
site during testing and actively involved in the implementation of the test plan. 
In addition to vendor supplied training, team members participated in LS-DYNA training 
sessions that were conducted by NASA. The model correlation approach used by the team was 
thoroughly reviewed and approved by NASA and Space Shuttle technical communities. The 
hardware evaluation results were presented to USA-SRB Element and NASA stakeholders for 
buy-in prior to taking the results forward to the Space Shuttle Program managers. Some of the 
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approaches and results were met with some resistance at NASA as the validation process was 
questioned. These issues were quickly resolved with subsequent in-depth discussions between 
team members and concerned parties. 
4.2 What Results Were Achieved 
Each of the four tasks on this project produced measurable results. The debris environment 
definition task produced data for thirty critical SRB components, satisfying the goal of defining 
the SRB debris environment. The impact test task completed thorough test programs for ice and 
foam debris, providing data to the model correlation team. The model correlation task verified 
that the dynamic models built with LS-DYNA could be used to reproduce the test data. The 
hardware evaluation task determined the structural capability for thirty components to withstand 
debris impacts. For each component, the team built an LS-DYNA model, determined the critical 
impact location and critical projectile orientation for ice and foam debris, analyzed TPS failures, 
and verified the component's functionality against several criteria. The analysis showed that 
while some components may receive damage, none would fail to function as required through 
SRB separation. Some results of the hardware evaluation are presented below. 
The Bolt Catcher was selected as a critical component because it retains half of the Forward 
Separation Bolt that attaches the SRB to the External Tank and is broken by the firing of 
pyrotechnic charges at SRB separation (Figure 11). The accident investigation identified that the 
Bolt Catcher might not be strong enough to retain the bolt half, and the assembly was redesigned. 
The LS-DYNA model shows a foam projectile impacting the Bolt Catcher, and the picture on the 
right presents the dynamic analysis results (Figure 12). The red area indicates the area with the 
highest impact stresses, where the most significant damage is most likely to occur. 
Figure 11. Bolt Catcher Location 
Figure 12. Bolt Catcher LS —DYNA Model and Impact Stresses (pre-SRB Separation) 
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The aft Integrated Electronics Assembly cover was selected as a critical component because it 
houses the integrated electronics assembly that is used to send commands to the separation bolts 
and Booster Separation Motors at SRB separation (Figure 13). If these commands are not 
properly relayed through the integrated electronics assembly, the SRBs might not separate as 
required. The LS-DYNA dynamic model and results are presented in the same format as the 
Bolt Catcher example (Figure 14). 
Figure 13. Aft Integrated Electronics Assembly Cover Location 
Figure 14. Aft Integrated Electronics Assembly Cover 
LS-DYNA Model and Impact Stresses 
The aft Booster Separation Motor nozzle was selected as a critical component because the 
motors fire at SRB separation to push the SRBs away from the rest of the Shuttle (Figure 15). If 
an exit cone is damaged, the motors might not fire as expected and the separation might not 
occur as required. The LS-DYNA dynamic model and results are presented in the same format 
as the previous examples. 
Figure 15. Aft Booster Separation Motor Nozzle Location 
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Figure 16. Aft Booster Separation Motor Nozzle LS-DYNA Model and Impact Stresses 
This project resulted in several significant improvements over time. Obviously, since no 
analysis was in place when this task began, the successful completion of the project is a 
significant improvement in the data that is available to make informed decisions regarding the 
potential debris risk. Once the four primary tasks were completed, the team went above and 
beyond the requirements and recommended four design changes that could be made to enhance 
Space Shuttle safety and further reduce the risk to SRB hardware and flight crews. After the 
thirty most critical SRB hardware components had been analyzed, the team looked for other 
ways to use the tools that had been developed. The dynamic modeling techniques were used for 
several components that do not have a function that is critical to flight safety such as the three 
components illustrated above. Some of these additional components were considered because a 
foam or ice impact could potentially liberate material on the SRB that then had the potential to 
impact other parts of the Shuttle. 
Another improvement that helped to exceed the team's original goals was the development of a 
quick assessment tool that could be used for analysis of potential debris sources on launch day. 
Without this tool, USA-SRB Element would have no way to quickly determine if a potential 
debris source could pose a safety risk to SRB hardware and a launch scrub or delay could result. 
The "real-time tool" used for launches as wells as launch simulations was developed after all of 
the critical SRB components were evaluated with the provided debris environment data. This 
tool is contained in an Excel database that is divided into three sections. The first part of this 
database identifies the debris source based on material type (ice or foam), dimensions and the 
location on the vehicle where it is released. The second part defines the debris environment, 
where the debris source is characterized and the impact energy is determined at different times 
during flight to find the critical impact time. The last part of the database contains the structural 
capability of each SRB component to withstand a foam or ice impact and uses the information 
from the second part to determine whether the component is able to survive the predicted impact 
condition. This tool gives USA-SRB Element the ability to perform a comparative analysis for 
all of the components and make a go/no-go decision for launch in a manner of a few minutes. 
The type of analysis that can be performed with the launch tool is shown for the four components 
previously discussed in this report (Figure 17). The component names are listed on the bottom 
of the plot along with bars indicating capability in terms of expected debris energy levels. The 
blue and yellow horizontal lines represent the predicted energy levels for the ice and foam debris, 
respectively. These values would be calculated based on the debris size, shape and location on 
the vehicle as identified by the debris inspection team either during a launch simulation or on 
launch day. The blue and yellow vertical bars represent the component's capability in terms of 
kinetic energy to withstand ice or foam debris impacts, respectively. Therefore, it can be seen in 
that at the given energy levels for foam, all of the components except the Bolt Catcher have a 
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large margin of capability. The aft Booster Separation Motor (BSM) nozzle and aft Integrated 
Electronics Assembly (TEA) cover indicate a minimal margin of capability above the predicted 
ice energy level. The Upper Strut Fairing is right at its ice capability, and the Bolt Catcher could 
not survive either of the predicted ice and foam impacts. Therefore, if the potential debris 
sources were predicted to impact the Bolt Catcher, the SRB would be a no-go for launch. 
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Figure 17. Sample of Launch Support Debris Analysis Tool 
4.3 What Impact Did the Project Have on the Organization 
The primary goal of this project was to support RTF by defining the SRB debris environment 
and hardware capability. The team received approval for their analysis from the Space Shuttle 
Program management and supported the Shuttle launch on July 26, 2005. Additionally, the team 
incorporated USA's corporate goals of safety, customer satisfaction, professional development 
and financial accountability throughout the entire project. Each of these goals was addressed, 
incorporated, and impacted by the team's project. 
Safety - Ensuring safety was achieved by verifying that all SRB hardware would still function as 
designed after being impacted by foam and ice debris. In addition to evaluating the initial 
survivability to the debris impact, the structural and thermal loading through SRB separation 
were also analyzed to verify that the damage would not propagate and reach an unacceptable 
level. Following USA-SRB Element procedures, all models and analyses were thoroughly 
reviewed to ensure they were technically sound and accurate. The testing and modeling verified 
that all critical components would function as expected, and the safety of the mission and crew 
would not be compromised. Despite the fact that no components had an unacceptable margin, 
four design changes were incorporated to further reduce the risk that a debris impact might have 
on a critical system. Additionally, the development of the launch support debris analysis tools 
allowed for assessment of potential debris sources on the day of launch to verify that the launch 
would be safe and successful. 
Customer Satisfaction - Excellent customer satisfaction and quality were achieved by 
maintaining a high level of stakeholder involvement throughout the process. Test plans, material 
models, and impact analysis results were continually reported to and approved by various 
stakeholders. Each individual test received the approval of quality engineering and correlation 
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studies were only conducted on test shots meeting specific standards. Team members met on 
several occasions to verify that all critical hardware were analyzed and there were no additional 
concerns that might have been overlooked. Also, all models and analyses were put through an 
internal checking process as part of the modeling correlation hardware evaluations tasks. USA-
SRB Element met all stacking and launch milestones associated with RTF. The efforts put forth 
by the debris team were cited by NASA in award fee evaluations as an "example of outstanding 
RTF support" and an "area of superb performance." 
Professional Development - This project offered team members a new and challenging problem 
that provided the opportunity to improve their skills and develop their experience base. The 
tasks of this project required innovative solutions that were best accomplished through advanced 
analysis techniques and the use of specialized software programs that were new to the 
organization. All team members who worked on the model correlation and hardware evaluation 
tasks were provided with advanced training in LS-DYNA. Team members became more 
familiar with SRB thermal protection systems, hardware, and hardware functions, and now have 
a solid experience base with new skills that can be used to solve future engineering challenges. 
Fiscal Accountability - The financial returns of this project exist as a cost savings to USA and 
NASA. The work performed was done as efficiently as possible in several ways. During testing 
the team established minimum criteria of success so that once a sufficient amount of data had 
been collected, additional planned tests did not need to be performed. Additional testing related 
costs were alleviated through this technique by reducing the number of flight hardware articles 
expended. Additionally, computer simulations were used instead of testing all flight hardware, 
resulting in a significant savings of both time and money. Whenever possible, data from existing 
computer models was used to reduce analysis time and costs, and any new computer models that 
were built can be used in future analyses. 
Sustaining actions were developed to enable continued safe and efficient operations. The launch 
support tools were used to support several launch simulations and the RTF Shuttle launch, and 
will continue to be used to assess potential debris sources on launch day. The tool will continue 
to pr,ovide USA-SRB Element with the ability to make a quick assessment for debris concerns 
raised on the launch pad. Additionally, the skills developed by team members will be a valuable 
asset to USA, NASA and the Space Shuttle Program. 
The debris team is not willing to rest on developments that have been made. Any design changes 
or additional new hardware that can be considered debris impact sensitive will be addressed 
using the same exacting techniques. The launch support tools can also be improved 
dramatically. The quick assessment currently uses results from the defined debris environment 
to establish verified limits. The modeling efforts and the launch support tool can be expanded to 
include absolute upper limits of the hardware capability. As the space program transitions into 
the next generation vehicle, the SRBs will continue to play a key role. The tools and abilities 
developed during this task will prove valuable in the future. 
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